NEW ADDITIONS TO THE LEXICON OF
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION*
Jerome G. Rose**
In January 1983 the New Jersey Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II)' in which it reaffirmed the state
constitutional mandate that municipalities provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of low and moderate income housing, and
set forth a panoply of judicial remedies to enforce this mandate. 2
Eight years earlier in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I)3 the court first held that
the zoning ordinance of a developing municipality4 was invalid if it
failed affirmatively to afford an opportunity for an "appropriate variety and choice of housing" to meet the municipality's present and
prospective fair share of the low and moderate income housing needed
in the region. 5 In Mount Laurel II the court determined that the
intervening seven or more years had produced litigation instead of
housing, thus necessitating more drastic judicial intervention. 6 In the
* Copyright 0 1984 by Jerome G. Rose. This is a part of a larger work by the author on the
Mount Laurel II decision.
** Professor of Urban Planning, Rutgers University: Editor-in-Chief, Real Estate Law Journal; B.A., Cornell University, 1948; J.D., Harvard University, 1951.
92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel II].
2 See id. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel I].
I As described in Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 160, 336 A.2d at 717, a "developing municipality" in New Jersey has: sizeable land area outside the central cities and older, built-up suburbs of
northern and southern metropolitan areas; substantially shed any rural characteristics; undergone great population increase since World War II, or is now in the process of doing so; is not
completely developed; and remains in the path of inevitable future residential, commercial, and
industrial demand and growth. See also Glenview* Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 164 N.J.
Super. 563, 567-68, 397 A.2d 384, 386 (Law Div. 1968), affd in part, revd in part sub nom.
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d
390 (1983).
5 Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. For an analysis of the Mount Laurel I
decision, see generally Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking?, 4
REAL EST. L.J. 61 (1975) (recognizing need for legislative creation of administrative agency as
appropriate entity for implementation of underlying policy judgments); see also Rose, Myths and
Misconceptions of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 99 (1979) (elimination of
exclusionary zoning results in primary benefit to developers and real estate investors who utilize
mythical, moral, and legal justifications to perpetuate their profits). But see Mallach, Exclusionary Zoning Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 275 (1981) (elimination of
restrictive zoning provisions threshold step in creating low and moderate income housing opportunities).
6 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 409-10. For an analysis of Mount Laurel II
and an appraisal of the effectiveness and propriety of the role of the judiciary, see Rose, The
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process of creating a more effective remedy for enforcement of its
decision that exclusionary zoning is invalid under the state constitution, 7 the court created new legal concepts by the use of new judicial
language. In addition, new legal phrases have been created in reaction to the court's new concepts. This article will discuss both categories of additions to the lexicon of exclusionary zoning litigation.
I.

NEW LEGAL CONCEPTS CREATED

BY

JUDICIAL LANGUAGE

Principles of sound planning (prun'si p'ls * ov o sound - plan' ning),

n. Fundamental truths or settled rules of action utilized to describe a
systematic, comprehensive, continuous, forward-looking process of
analysis of a community's constraints for the purpose of formulating
and implementing a plan for the achievement of the goals and objec8
tives of the community.
The court uses variations of the phrase "principles of sound planning," such as "sound municipal land use planning," 9 "unplanned
growth,"' 0 "sound planning concepts,"" "sound planning," 12 "requirements of sound planning,"' 3 "regional planning goals,"' 4 "comprehensive rational plan,'

5

"sensible planning,'

6

"sound planning

Mount Laurel II Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115 (1983)
(court's recognition of state constitutionally protected right to affordable housing based on
idealistic economic and political assumptions may result in acceleration of urban flight).
I See Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 208-13, 456 A.2d at 415-17. In Mount Laurel Il the court
reaffirmed its earlier finding that the constitutional power to zone, see N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6,
para. 2, must be exercised for the general welfare:
When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects something as fundamental
as housing, the general welfare includes more than the welfare of that municipality
and its citizens: it also includes the general welfare-in this case the housing needsof those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to
the housing demand within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that
conflict with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power and are
unconstitutional. In particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite
opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low and moderate income
housing conflict with the general welfare and violate the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection.
Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415 (citing Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174, 181, 366
A.2d at 724, 730).
' This definition is a composite of definitions of the component words from WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1944) and J.G. ROSE, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF URBAN PLANNING
53 (1979); see also J.S. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING (1965).

' Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 211, 456 A.2d at 416.
10 Id. at 236, 456 A.2d at 428.

1 Id.
'2 Id.
" Id.
'4 Id.
"s Id.
"6Id.

at 226, 237-38, 456 A.2d at 424, 430.
at 211, 224, 456 A.2d at 416, 423.
at 243, 456 A.2d at 433.
at 225, 246, 456 A.2d at 423, 434.
at 247, 456 A.2d at 435.
at 329, 456 A.2d at 478.
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principles,"' 7 and "rational long-range land use planning"'" throughout the decision. The court's frequent use of these phrases to explain
and justify major urban policy decisions emphasizes the importance of
these "planning" concepts as the fundamental bases of the decision.
The validity and meaning of the Mount Laurel II decision, therefore,
depends upon the validity and meaning of these concepts.
The phrase "principles of sound planning" can be deceptive. It
would be erroneous to ascribe to this phrase the same certainty and
exactitude that one would attribute to phrases such as "principles of
physics" or "principles of sound bridge construction." Yet, the phrase
carries with it, and the court utilized it to convey, an implication of
unerring, precise, rigorous, and constant truths that are associated
with the scientific principles of physics or engineering principles of
sound bridge construction. To the extent that the phrase "principles of
sound planning" does not provide a similar exactitude, consensus, or
general professional acceptance, it must fail as the justification for the
major urban policy decisions made by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the Mount Laurel II decision.
What are the "principles of sound planning?" Do these principles
provide the standards for an objective or scientific evaluation of the
constitutionality of municipal land use regulations? These questions
direct attention to the underlying theories of the urban planning
profession. It would be inappropriate to attempt to describe all such
principles in this article.' 9 A brief analysis of some of the major
principles and components of the concept of urban planning, however, will illustrate the fundamental differences between the "principles of sound planning" and principles of more exact physical sciences.
Before describing the principles of planning, attention must be
directed to the fact that the subject of the judicial language is urban
planning. Although there are some similarities among the various
processes of planning, it is clear that the subject under consideration is
not corporate planning, family planning, military planning, national
resource planning, or any planning other than urban planning. The
new legal concept on which the court has focused attention deals with
"principles of sound [urban] planning."
In spite of the court's authoritative reference thereto, there is no
authoritative compendium of "principles of sound [urban] planning."

t7Id. at 331, 456 A.2d at 480.
18Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.
IS For a more complete analysis of the principles of urban planning, see J.S.
note 8; W.I.

GOODMAN

& E.C.

CHAPIN,

FREUND, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING

supra
(1968).
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Insofar as any compendium exists at all, it would have to be deduced
from the definition of "urban planning" and the application of a
political philosophy thereto. In defining "urban planning" most members of the profession would agree to the following components:
1. Urban planning is a rational process of analysis of the forces,
needs, and constraints that affect the future growth, development, or
other changes in the urban area under study.
2. Urban planning is a comprehensive process. It seeks to study,
describe and evaluate all relevant forces, needs, and constraints such
as the demographic, environmental, economic, sociological, and political forces that will affect future changes in the jurisdiction.
3. Urban planning is a process which proposes a plan for the use
of the jurisdiction's land and other resources that is consistent with the
relevant forces and constraints disclosed by such study and which
seeks to provide a rational and comprehensive balance among the
competing community needs and constraints.
4. Urban planning is future-oriented in that it is concerned with
designing proposals and programs to meet needs and improve conditions at some time in the future.
5. Urban planning is a continuous process that is intended to be
an ongoing activity by which previous plans are updated and modified in response to changing facts and available information.
6. Urban planning is a process that is designed to formulate a
plan to achieve the jurisdiction's goals and objectives, protect the
20
public safety and health, and promote the general welfare.
7. Urban planning is an advisory process to assist the appropriately authorized governmental officials in their decisionmaking process. Planners are professionally trained advisers on urban growth and
change but are not usually authorized to make policy decisions on
behalf of any governmental entity.
The definition of "urban planning" illustrates the potential variance that "sound principles" thereof will encompass depending upon
the socioeconomic-political philosophy of the formulation. For example, the prescription of the formulator whose goals are a more equitable distribution of private property and natural resources will vary
greatly from the principles formulated by someone whose philosophy
20 The importance of Mount Laurel I rests, in part, on the court having defined the
constitutional obligation to provide for the general welfare as including citizens beyond the
borders of the particular municipality. Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726. Thus, a
municipality, in regulating land use, must serve the broader public interest of providing an
opportunity for housing on a regional basis, rather than exercising its zoning authority to further
parochial interests. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
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favors a maximum of personal freedom and individual enterprise.
Therefore, in its application of "principles of sound planning," the
decision in Mount Laurel II may rest upon little more than a set of
undeclared and elusive principles of social, economic, and political
philosophy of the members of the court.
Affirmative measures (a fur' ma tiv * mezh' erz), n. positive actions
or efforts (similar to "affirmative action") to "afford a realistic opportunity for the construction of the municipality's fair share of the
region's lower income housing" when removal of restrictive land use
2
barriers are insufficient to provide such housing. 1
The court describes three basic types of "affirmative measures"
that a municipality can use to make the opportunity for lower income
housing realistic. They include (1) encouraging or requiring the use of
available state or federal housing subsidies; (2) providing incentives
for or requiring private developers to set aside a portion of their
developments for lower income housing ("mandatory set-asides"); and
(3) overzoning, an inclusionary zoning device by which a municipality
22
zones for more than its fair share of the regional housing need.
The court begins its explanation of these measures by conceding
that the construction of lower income housing is practically impossible
without some form of governmental subsidy. 23 The court recognized
that nonaction on the part of municipalities in obtaining these subsidies would make a charade of the Mount Laurel principle which
requires municipalities to provide a realistic opportunity for low income housing through their land use regulations. 24 Consequently, it
suggested that eligibility for subsidies could be accomplished through
as simplistic a measure as the adoption of a resolution of need or the
granting of municipal tax abatements. 25 This would appear to give the
trial court the power to require municipalities to adopt these measures, thus assuring good faith cooperation on the26 part of the municipality in assisting developers to obtain subsidies.
The other types of affirmative measures discussed by the court
include "incentive zoning, '27 "mandatory set-asides," and "overzonMt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 261, 456 A.2d at 443.
Id. at 262-70, 456 A.2d at 443-47.
23 Id. at 263, 456 A.2d at 444, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
24 Mt. Laurel HI, 92 N.J. at 264, 456 A.2d at 444.
25 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14J-6(b), 8(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984)).
26 Id. at 265, 456 A.2d at 445.
27 "Incentive zoning" is a zoning technique that offers an increase in permitted density,
commonly known as a density bonus, if the developer voluntarily agrees to provide lower income
housing. Id. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
21
22
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ing." These terms are sufficiently important to justify separate defini28
tions and discussions below.
In adopting the concept of "affirmative measures" as a prerequisite for municipal zoning validity, the court settled a question which
29
was forcefully argued during the four days of oral argument:
Whether requiring a municipality to undertake affirmative action, a
power usually regarded as uniquely within the legislative process, is
beyond the scope of judicial authority as violative of the separation of
powers doctrine. 30 An interesting discourse ensued when a Justice
posited whether the court, once having determined that there was a
violation of the state constitution, had the power to propose ways to
avoid that violation. 31 The attorney responded that the principle of
separation of powers did not prevent the court from invalidating an
unconstitutional ordinance but did prevent the judiciary from providing a legislative or administrative remedy. A Justice pursued this issue
and then asked:
Suppose a court invalidates an exclusionary zoning ordinance and
in response, the municipality amends the ordinance. When challenged again, the court invalidates it again. Suppose this procedure
is repeated twenty times. Isn't there a point where the court can
give the municipality some hint as to what provisions will be
acceptable and constitutional?

58 See the discussion of "overzoning," infra notes 36-42 and "mandatory set-asides," infra
notes 43-73. "Incentive zoning" will not be given independent treatment because, as the Mount
Laurel II court recognized, it is not in actuality a viable affirmative measure. Mt. Laurel II, 94
N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445 (builders reluctant to cooperate with incentive zoning programs
regardless of potential profitability) (citing Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low
and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1067 (1977)).
2" The author attended all four days of oral argument of Mount Laurel II before the New
Jersey Supreme Court on October 20, 21, 22, and December 15, 1980 and took copious notes of
the proceedings. Reference to statements and events during the oral argument is based on those
notes. The usual transcript of proceedings as well as a video tape recording was made by or
under the direction of the court.
" A judicial mandate upon coordinate branches of government to compel the taking of
affirmative measures in order to correct constitutional deficiencies is not without precedent. See,
e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although the courts
of New Jersey have been reticent to encroach upon the legislative domain in areas of economic
and social welfare, they have done so as a last resort when the legislature has failed to act. See
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Pascack
Ass'n, Ltd. v. Township of Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1974),
modified, 74 N.J. 470, 397 A.2d 6 (1977).
11 The dialogue set forth in text is an accurate account of the interchange and contains many
of the words used by the participants but is not a word-for-word transcript of the statements. See
supra note 29.
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The response of the attorney was:
No. It is within the power of a court to make any suggestions it
wants to in dicta but under the principles of separation of powers it
cannot prescribe ordinance provisions or provide for administrative
solutions, such as tax abatements or mandatory set-asides.
At another time in the discussion of this issue one of the Justices asked:
How do you respond to the argument that the principle of separation of powers applies only to the state branch of government, i.e.,
the state legislature, the state judiciary and the state governor and
does not apply to municipal government?32
To which the response was:
The New Jersey Constitution contains a specific provision giving
the legislature the power to delegate its zoning power to municipalities, 33 so whatever principles of separation of powers apply to the
state legislature also apply to the municipal governments that exercise that power.
This discourse was picked up by another Justice who, because of the
unfortunate form of his question, invited a response that he would
probably have preferred to avoid. The question was:
But after this court has determined that certain forms of restrictive
zoning are unconstitutional, what should I do when I see that
municipalities are ignoring this constitutional requirement?
The response of the ardent advocate of the principle of separation
of powers was:
Run for the State Legislature! And if you are elected you can
engage in the legislative process of devising programs to meet public policy needs.

32 In New Jersey, the formal doctrine of separation of powers as applicable to federal and
state governments has consistently been held inapplicable to municipalities. See In re Shain, 92
N.J. 524, 537, 457 A.2d 828, 835 (1982); Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 120, 104 A.2d 10, 17
(1954); Wintermute v. Ellenstein, 117 N.J.L. 274, 276, 187 A. 764, 765 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Graziano v. Mayor of Montville Township, 162 N.J. Super. 552, 563, 394 A.2d 103, 108 (App.
Div. 1978).
33 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, para. 2. That provision reads as follows:
The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, other than
counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified districts
and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their construction,
and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of land,
and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be within the police power of
the State. Such laws shall be subject to repeal or alteration by the Legislation.
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After this exchange, another Justice, in a mediating tone of voice,
asked:
Why can't this court move as far as a court can go to indicate to the
municipality what the solution to the problem is?
To which the attorney responded:
Who knows what the solution is? The Legislature has adopted
many programs to provide housing for low and moderate income
persons. 34 Those programs have been only partially successful....
Additional action involves public policy decisions involving public
It is not the function of courts to make these
expenditures ....
public policy decisions.
In spite of these and other arguments made by counsel in briefs
and oral arguments, the New Jersey Supreme Court has decided that
unless it requires the use of "affirmative measures," "the constitutional
guarantee that protects poor people from municipal exclusionary zoning will exist 'only on paper.' ",35 Therefore, the court has concluded
that the use of "affirmative measures" is not beyond the scope of
judicial authority.
Overzoning (6'vir * zon'ing), n. "zoning to allow for more than the
fair share [of regional housing needs] if it is likely, as it usually is, that
not all of the property made available for lower income housing will
'
actually result in such housing. 36
The court uses the term "overzoning" to describe an inclusionary
zoning device that municipalities must use to create a "realistic opportunity" for the construction of their fair share of the regional need for
lower income housing. 37 The court does not, however, deal with two
problems municipalities face in implementing overzoning.
34 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:14J-1 to -58 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (designed to
facilitate construction and rehabilitation of housing projects for families of moderate income by
providing for mortgage loans to qualified housing sponsors and exemption of certain housing
projects from real property taxation): Id. § 40:37A-106 (vests county improvement authorities
with powers necessary to undertake, finance, and operate housing projects for families of low
and moderate incomes); Id. § 17:1B-9.2 (authorizes New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency to
raise funds from private investors and make those funds available through mortgage lending
institutions and firms located within state for new residential loans as well as for residential,
rehabilitation, and improvement loans); Id. § 55:14J-30 (automatically ratifies, validates, and
confirms any municipal resolution adopted prior to effective date of act which grants or authorizes tax exemption or abatement for housing projects for low or moderate income families which
are financed by New Jersey Housing Finance Agency).
35 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 271, 456 A.2d at 448.
36 Id. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447 (emphasis in original).
37

Id.
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A. Planning Board Violations of the "Principlesof Sound Planning"
If the planning board recommends "overzoning" in its land use
plan, it necessarily violates that "principle of sound planning" which
requires that the use of the municipality's land and other resources be
based upon a rational and comprehensive balance among competing
needs and constraints. Before proposing a land use plan designating
the use of land to best meet the many needs of the jurisdiction, the
planning board must consider the potential detrimental impact of the
proposed development including traffic problems, flooding, air, water and noise pollution, and tax revenue and expenditures. Implementation of an overzoning device omits this balancing process, thus
violating the "principles of sound planning."
Moreover, by adopting the device of "overzoning," the Mount
Laurel II court made a policy decision that an oversupply of land for
high residential use will result in a lower market value of such land
and a reduced cost of housing construction, irrespective of other planning considerations. If the planning board bases its recommendation
of "overzoning" on this judicial policy decision rather than on its own
studies and analyses, the board will be forced to admit the invalidity
of its processes and conclusions and to abandon the principle of comprehensive and rational balance itself. This will seriously impair the
integrity of the planning process and will make "principles of sound
planning" a concept dependent upon the political, social, and economic judgments of the judiciary.
B. Governing Body Violations of the Municipal Land Use Law
If the municipal governing body adopts a zoning ordinance
which provides for "overzoning" inconsistent with the recommendations of the planning board in the land use element of the master
plan, 38 this action may violate the New Jersey Municipal Land Use

31 A master plan is a composite of written proposals for the development of a municipality
made pursuant to the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL). N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
40:55D-1 to -99 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) which in pertinent part provides:
a. The planning board may prepare and, after public hearing adopt or amend
a master plan, or component parts thereof, to guide the use of lands within the
municipality in a manner which protects public health and safety and promotes the
general welfare.
b. The master plan shall generally comprise a report or statement and land use
and development proposals, with maps, diagrams and text, presenting where appropriate, the following elements:
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Law (MLUL)3 9 which authorizes municipal governments to adopt
land use regulations. 40 Under the MLUL, the zoning ordinance must
be "substantially consistent" with the land use element of the adopted
master plan "or [be] designed to effectuate such plan element.' 41 The
governing body can avoid these provisions, "but only by affirmative
vote of a majority of the full authorized membership . . . with the

reasons . . for so acting recorded in the minutes. '42 Thus, by following this statutory procedure it is possible for the governing body to

(1) A statement of objectives, principles, assumptions, policies and standards
upon which the constituent proposals for the physical, economic and social development of the municipality are based;
(2) A land use plan element (a) taking into account the other master plan
elements and natural conditions, including, but not necessarily limited to, topography, soil conditions, water supply, drainage, flood plain areas, marshes, and woodlands, (b) showing the existing and proposed location, extent and intensity of development of land to be used in the future for varying types of residential, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational, educational and other public and private purposes or combination of purposes, and (c) including a statement of the standards of
population density and development intensity recommended for the municipality;
(3) A housing plan element, including but not limited to, residential standards
and proposals for the construction and improvement of housing;
(4) A circulation plan element showing the location and types of facilities for all
modes of transportation required for the efficient movement of people and goods
into, about, and through the municipality,
(5) A utility service plan element analyzing the need for and showing the future
general location of water supply and distribution facilities, drainage and flood
control facilities, sewerage and waste treatment, solid waste disposal and provision
for other related utilities;
(6) A community facilities plan element showing the location and type of
educational or cultural facilities, historic sites, libraries, hospitals, fire houses, police
stations and other related facilities, including their relation to the surrounding areas;
(7) A recreation plan element showing a comprehensive system of areas and
public sites for recreation;
(8) A conservation plan element providing for the preservation, conservation,
and utilization of natural resources, including, to the extent appropriate, open
space, water, forests, soil, marshes, wetlands, harbors, rivers and other waters,
fisheries, wildlife and other natural resources;
(9) An energy conservation plan element which systematically analyzes the
impact of each other component and element of the master plan on the present and
future use of energy in the municipality, details specific measures contained in the
other plan elements designed to reduce energy consumption, and proposes other
measures that the municipality may take to reduce energy consumption and to
provide for the maximum utilization of renewable energy sources; and
(10) Appendices or separate reports containing the technical foundation for the
master plan and its constituent elements.
Id. § 40:55D-28.
39 Id. §§ 40:55D-1 to -99.
40 Id. § 40:55D-62.
41

Id.

42

Id.
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"overzone" land for high residential use where such recommendation
is not contained in the land use element of the master plan. The
governing body will offer as a reason for its divergence from the
master plan its obligation to comply with the Mount Laurel II decision. Yet, it must be recognized that this provision was added to the
state enabling legislation for quite another purpose: to allow an
elected local governing body to prevail over a nonelected planning
board when there is a difference between them. This raises the question of whether the state legislature intended the provision to authorize municipal governing bodies to reject the land use element of the
master plan because of a judicial mandate rather than for reasons of
local legislative discretion.
Mandatory set-asides (man'dat6r' e a set a sidz'), n. a technique of
inclusionary zoning and a component of "affirmative measures" necessary for a valid municipal zoning ordinance that requires (as distinguished from a voluntary action) "developers [to] include a minimum
amount of lower income housing in their projects.- 43
The court substituted the shorter, catchier phrase "mandatory
set-asides" for the more awkward language previously used in the
literature: "mandatory percentage of moderately priced dwellings"
(MPMPD). 44 One reason why the court found it preferable to create
its own phrase may have been an intention to substitute the requirement of "lower income housing" for that of "moderately priced dwelling" contained in the previous MPMPD wording. There are several
questions about this particular addition to the lexicon of exclusionary
zoning litigation that invite further study and analysis: (1) Is the
technique economically feasible? (2) Is it administratively feasible as a
judicial remedy? (3) Does the "mandatory" aspect undermine its constitutional validity under the state or federal due process clauses?
A. Economic Feasibility
The court cites an economic feasibility study prepared for the
Regional Planning Board of Princeton 45 in 1974 to support its assump-

4 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
14 See
Rose, The Mandatory Percentage of Moderately Priced Dwelling Ordinance
(MPMPD) Is the Latest Technique of Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 176 (1974).
Is The author was a member of the Regional Planning Board of Princeton from 1973 until
after the Princeton Community Master Plan was adopted in 1980, see infra note 52, during
which period he chaired the Land Use Committee whose responsibilities included the preparation of the Land Use Element of the Master Plan. See supra note 39.
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tion that "mandatory set-asides" are economically feasible. 46 This
study was designed to determine whether an "internal subsidy" could
be created for the construction of low and moderate income housing
by the "capture of the increase in land values that occurs when land is
rezoned for higher densities. - 41 One of the principal assumptions in
this study was that land zoned for low density development could be
purchased by developers at relatively low cost. 48 The study showed

that if the developer purchased land at a lower cost, he could then
obtain approval for higher-density development and consequently the
value of his land would increase. His per-unit land cost would be
reduced substantially by the increased allowable density, thereby creating a "fund" for the "internal subsidy" of a specified amount of low
and moderate income housing. 49 The study concluded that it would be
economically feasible to create an "internal subsidy" for up to thirtyfour percent of the units built, including fourteen percent of low
income units and twenty percent of moderate income units, if the
50
average gross density was increased to 3.2 units per acre.
The presentation of this study to the Regional Planning Board of
Princeton in 1974 met with substantial doubt and skepticism. This
skepticism increased as time passed and when the Master Plan was
finally adopted in 1980, the Planning Board rejected a mandatory setaside and instead recommended a zoning ordinance provision for an
optional conditional high density program.5 1 Designed to provide for
the community's present and future local and regional housing needs,
the Princeton Master Plan utilizes the designation of appropriate areas
as "conditional high density" areas. 52 This designation is one technique of implementing the plan whereby owners of land in these areas
are given a choice: They may develop the land as of right at a lower
density or they may develop the land at a higher density on condition

41

Mt. Laurel II 92 N.J. at 267 n.29, 456 A.2d at 446 n.29 (citing Real Estate Research

Corp., Housing Development Program Analysis Draft Report (Nov. 1974) [hereinafter RERC
Report] in DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON HOUSING PROPOSAL: A STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE BALANCED HOUSING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY 13-26 (1977).
41 DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON HOUSING PROPOSAL:
ACHIEVE BALANCED HOUSING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
48
49

A

STRATEGY TO

2 (1977).

Id.
Id.

I Id. at 3; see also id. at Appendix E (computer compilation of data forming basis for
conclusions of RERC Report).
51 REGIONAL PLANNING BOARD OF PRINCETON, PRINCETON COMMUNITY MASTER PLAN (Apr.

1980) [hereinafter cited as PRINCETON MASTER PLAN].
52 Id. at 82.
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that a specific number of low and moderately priced units are built.5 3
The recommendation of an "optional-conditional high density"
provision rather than a "mandatory set-aside" was based upon the
decision of the Princeton Planning Board that there was both a moral
and a legal obligation to permit the owners of land in "conditional
high density areas" to make some reasonable use of their property if
the findings of the "internal subsidy" study turned out to be incorrect. 54 It is readily conceded that the decision of one Planning Board
on this issue is far from conclusive. The recommendation of the
Princeton Planning Board does, however, call attention to the fact
that the evidence cited by the court to support the conclusion that
"mandatory set-asides" are economically feasible is less than conclusive.
B. Administrative Feasibility
The court described the concept of "mandatory set-asides" as an
inclusionary zoning technique that municipalities must use if they
cannot otherwise assure the construction of their fair share of lower
income housing. 55 It is interesting to note that municipalities must use
this technique even though the court concedes that there is a serious
question of the administrative feasibility of the technique. 56 In addition to the problem of limited federal subsidies to finance lower
income housing 57 there are several administrative problems that must
be resolved if this technique is to achieve the court's objectives. An
effective administrative mechanism must be created to establish standards and procedures for: (1) determining the eligibility of low income buyers and/or renters and reviewing their continuing eligibility;
(2) reviewing of rents through rent control of the lower rental units
and regulation of the market rent apartments that are serving to
"subsidize" the lower rental units; and (3) approving the purchase and

53

Id.

" See so pra note 48.
" Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 265, 456 A.2d at 445.
11 See id. at 265, 268, 456 A.2d at 446-47. Actually, the court said that "[w]here practical, a
city should use mandatory set-asides even where subsidies are not available." Id. at 268, 456
A.2d at 446-47.
See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 510-11 & n.20, 371
A.2d 1192, 1206-07 & n.20 (1977); see also CENTER FOR UPRAN POLIcY RESEARCH, 'Mou.\"rLAUREL
II: CHALLENGE AND DELIVERY OF Low-CosT HOUSING 86 (Rutgers University 1983).
57
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the sale prices for subsequent unit sales.58 The court once again directed attention to the "sophisticated approach" proposed by Princeton Township as a satisfactory resolution to these problems.5 9 The
mechanism proposed by Princeton,60 but never enacted into law,
consisted of two parts: (1) disposition covenants that would bind
owners and renters of such units to sell or rent only to persons at lower
income levels, and (2) a "public trust" that would enforce the covenant and deal with the three administrative problems described
above.6 ' Although many studies and proposals were considered by the
Princeton Regional Planning Board, the court focused its attention on
this one proposal as an example of a "more sophisticated approach" to
'
solving the administrative issues involved in "mandatory set-asides. 62
When the Princeton Community Master Plan was finally adopted it
contained a recommendation for the creation of a "Community Housing Trust" with the power to ensure that subsidized units will continue to be available to eligible lower income purchasers and renters
as well as the power to procure additional housing and to buy and sell
existing housing. 3
C. ConstitutionalValidity
The phrase "[m]andatory set-asides" is a euphemism for a judicial requirement that a developer of land contribute the incomeproducing potential of a specified proportion of his property to pro-

"sFor a discussion of the problems of administration of the mandatory set-aside and other
aspects of the builder's remedy in general, see Rose, supra note 6.
59 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
60 See Miller & Porter for the Regional Planning Bd. of Princeton, A Report Updating and
Supplementing Part III of the Princeton Housing Proposal: A Strategy to Achieve Balanced
Housing without Governmental Subsidy (Dec. 1979).
"1 Id. at 14-25; Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447. Several members of the
Regional Planning Board of Princeton, including myself, objected to the use of the phrase,
"public trust." Its primary author, the late William Miller, the Planning Board attorney and a
well-respected, competent lawyer and amiable fellow, prevailed on this issue. Some of us
decided not to "bicker about words" when there were too many other more important and
complex issues to be resolved. Nevertheless, the use of the phrase "public trust" as the nomenclature to describe the municipal administrative agency to be created was misleading because the
administrative agency would be no more "public" and no more a "trust" than any other
regulatory agency. The municipal governing body would have to create an administrative
agency with power to control rents, sales prices, initial and continuing eligibility of tenants and
to deal with some even more troublesome questions that will arise such as proposals for "affirmative action" to assure racial balance in the projects. An analysis of the political and fiscal
feasibility and consequences of such an agency is beyond the scope of this article.
2 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
03 PRINCETON MASTER PLAN, supra note 51, at 95. On May 22, 1984 the Princeton Township
Committee introduced an ordinance known as the "Affordable Housing Ordinance" that in-

1984]

MOUNT LAUREL SYMPOSIUM

vide housing for lower income persons. The court avoided a more
emotive phrase that may in many respects provide a more accurate
description of the obligation: "mandatory give-aways." The constitutional issue presented is very similar to the issue that would be created
if a court, having found that a large proportion of the urban poor are
ill-fed, required the municipality to require all (chain) food stores in
the city to contribute a specified proportion of their annual sales to
provide food for lower income persons. In both cases the issues that
arise are whether the requirement violates the due process, equal
protection, and taking clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
The issue is confounded by the fact that there are no due process
or equal protection clauses in the New Jersey Constitution! Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court, having determined in Mount
Laurel I that there ought to be such clauses, ruled that those clauses
were inherent in the state constitution. 4 Then, having established the
existence of these most fundamental of all constitutional provisions,6 5
the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to have freed itself of the
annoyance of appeal to the United States Supreme Court of its decisions relating thereto by deciding that the inherent due process and
equal protection clauses in the state constitution "may be more demanding" than their federal counterparts. 6 As a result of this casuistry, it can hardly be expected that either clause will provide a basis
to challenge the validity of the court's own creation-"mandatory setasides."
On the other hand, the real due process and equal protection
clauses in the Federal Constitution create genuine legal problems.
Whenever a police power regulation is challenged under the due
process clause, its validity is determined by the judicial process of
balancing the general welfare benefits against the detrimental impact
cludes, inter alia, a conditional high density provision. This ordinance, in some modified form, is
expected to be adopted after additional public hearings. See The Princeton Packet, May 22, 1984
at 14A, col. 1.
11 Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725. The state constitutional provision in
which the court has determined the due process and equal protection clauses to be "inherent"
provides: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1.
11 See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 482, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (equal protection provision
"implicit" in New Jersey Constitution) (citing Bailey v. Engelman, 56 N.J. 54, 55, 264 A.2d 442,
442 (1970)).
16 Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725; Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 482,
490-92, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (state constitutions may be more exacting than Federal Constitution).
See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights,
95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982).
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of the regulation on the plaintiff. 67 If, after giving due deference to
the legislative prerogative to determine public policy, the court finds
that the benefits to the general welfare are insufficient to justify a
confiscatory impact upon the plaintiff, a court may find the regula68
tion invalid under the due process clause.
There is still no federal decision dealing directly with this issue.
The decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Fairfax County Board
of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc.,69 is the most frequently
cited authority on the issue. In that case the court invalidated a
Fairfax County ordinance which required a developer of fifty or more
dwelling units to commit himself, before site plan approval, to build
at least fifteen percent of dwelling units for low and moderate income
housing. 70 The court held that the ordinance exceeded the authority
granted to the local governing body by the enabling act because it was
directed to socioeconomic objectives rather than the physical characteristics authorized by the state statute. 71 Moreover, the court held
that the requirement to rent or sell fifteen percent of the dwelling
units at prices not fixed by a free market, violated the state constitutional provision that no property be taken or damaged for public
purpose without just compensation. 72 Challenging the mandatory setaside provision under the federal due process clause will necessitate
employment of a similar rationale: The confiscatory impact taken
together with evidence illustrating the limited effectiveness of the
regulation in achieving its objective raises a question of validity.
A federal equal protection clause challenge requires a showing
that the ordinance unreasonably discriminated against the class 73 consisting of developers or owners of real estate and/or the purchasers or
renters of the housing units whose prices or rents must be increased to
subsidize the housing of low income persons. It is at least debatable
whether renters or purchasers of the other units in a housing development are the appropriate persons to bear the costs of providing a fair
share of the regional housing needs. Thus, the argument can be made

17 See, e.g., Coldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (in evaluating reasonableness of
state safety ordinance, Court considered state's police power to protect its citizens and constitutional rights of individuals).
68 See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HAeV. L. REV. 1427, 1472 & n.49 (1978).
214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
10 Id. at 238, 198 S.E.2d at 602.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAHV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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that it is unreasonable to impose the obligation of providing for a
"regional" housing need upon this small component of the larger
region.
Least cost housing (lest' * k6st * hou' zing), n. the least expensive
housing that builders can provide after the municipality removes all
excessive restrictions and exactions and thoroughly uses all affirmative
4
devices that might lower costs.1
In Mount Laurel I the court required municipal zoning ordinances to provide land for housing for low and moderate income
persons.7 5 Two years later, in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 76 the court substituted the concept of least cost housing
for the Mount Laurel I requirement of low and moderate income
housing. 77 The Madison Township court cited as the reason for the
change of criterion the improbability of building low and moderate
income housing without substantial government subsidies which were
and which remain unforeseeable.7 8
The concept of least cost housing was preserved by the court in
Mount Laurel 11. 7 The most significant aspect of the court's definition
of "least cost housing," however, is that it specifically avoids including
lower income persons as the beneficiaries of such housing. Indeed, the
court conceded that the primary beneficiaries of least cost housing
would not be lower income persons who "presumably" could not
afford such housing, but those "families who could not afford housing
in the conventional suburban housing market. '"
The court purported to limit the use of the "least cost" test to
special conditions, such as where extremely high land costs make it
impossible for the "fair share" obligation to be met even after all
excessive restrictions and exactions have been removed and after all
affirmative measures have been utilized."' Despite this limitation, the
reaffirmation of the least cost concept in Mount Laurel II represents
an abandonment of the original Mount Laurel I objective of providing
housing in the suburbs for lower income persons.
"' Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
" See Mt. Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
76 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
77 Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
78 Id. at 510-11, 371 A.2d at 1206; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
71 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451-52.
so Id. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
11 Id. The court further stated that housing for middle income persons would not meet the
Mount Laurel test unless the "least cost- housing test was met-and that test can only be met if
the municipality uses all affirmative measures including overzoning for mobile homes.
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The adoption of the least cost housing standard not only resulted
in the abandonment of earlier recognized principles, but also placed
the court in the more embarrassing position of accepting the "trickle
down" theory, which it prefers to call "filter down,"' 82 to explain how
lower income persons in the urban areas are going to benefit from the
Gordian judicial enforcement system it creates in Mount Laurel II.
Under this theory, lower income persons would benefit only to the
extent that upper income persons, who can afford "least cost housing," move out of their city dwelling units, resulting in an eventual
"trickle down" of these units to the lower income city residents. 83 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, despite its alleged rejection of the trickle
down theory,8 4 has promulgated, through its adoption of the least cost
housing standard, an urban policy that encourages upper income
persons to move from the central cities to the suburbs leaving the
urban poor with the problems and costs of the deteriorating older
cities 85
The court seeks to avoid the consequences of this economic and
social reality by creating a nice judicial distinction between the primary obligation of every municipality to provide a fair share of lower
income housing and a "supplementary" obligation for "least cost h.ousing" where "special conditions" make it impossible to meet the primary obligation. 86 Only under these "special conditions" is the "least
cost-trickle down" theory an acceptable alternative to housing for
lower income persons. 87 Thus, the court appears to be faithful to the
ideal of providing new housing in the suburbs for the poor while
recognizing the economic realities that belie the hope of achieving
that ideal.
Suitability (soot' a bil i ti), n. having conditions, properties, or characteristics that are appropriate or fitted to the purpose. 8 After the

Id. at 278, 456 A.2d at 451-52.
11 See id.; see also Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 513-14 & n.22, 371 A.2d at 1208 & n.22.
14 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278, 456 A.2d at 451-52.
85 For an analysis of the dilemma faced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in deciding
whether to abandon or reconfirm the "least cost" housing test, see Rose, supra note 6.
" See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
12

" See id.
" See id.at 232, 456 A.2d at 427 (citing N.J.

DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DIVISION OF

STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING, STATE DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN

237-38, 456 A.2d at 430.

(May 1980)); see also id. at
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region's future housing need has been forecast, it becomes necessary to
allocate the number of units among the municipalities in that region. 89 "Suitability" is the word used to describe the "overall group of
factors that must be considered" when making the "fair share" allocation.9 0
The Mount Laurel obligation of a New Jersey municipality in a
"growth" area is to provide a "realistic opportunity" for the construction of its "fair share" of the future "regional need" for low and
moderate income housing. 9' The court recognized that the process of
allocating regional need to municipalities should not be accomplished
by simplistic methods such as mandating an equal number of lower
income units or an equal proportion of units in each municipality or
by making the proportion the same as that of the county.9 2 Rather, the
court determined that the fair share allocation process should involve
consideration of an "overall group of factors . . . subsumed in the
word 'suitability.' "'

Although the court did not set forth the objective elements of
suitability, 94 it would appear that in determining the suitability of a
municipality for low and moderate income housing the "principles of
sound planning" would require consideration of the following factors:

5

(1) employment opportunities; (2) public transportation; (3)

adequacy of educational, medical, and social services; (4) adequacy of
water and sewage facilities; (5) ecological impact; (6) fiscal capacity
of the municipality to provide the requisite services; and (7) present
tax rate and the tax burden to be borne by the future low and
moderate income residents.

89 See id. at 256-58, 456 A.2d at 440-41.

Id. at 350, 456 A.2d at 489.
See id. at 238-39, 256-58, 456 A.2d at 431, 440-41. There are several steps in the process of
quantifying the municipality's housing obligation: (1) identifying the relevant region; (2) estimating the municipality's present housing needs and predicting the municipality's future needs;
and (3) allocating those needs to the municipalities in the region. Id. at 248, 456 A.2d at 436.
92 Id. at 350, 456 A.2d at 489.
93 Id.
11Indeed, the court skirted this complex issue with the statement that "these factors have
been described and need not be repeated here." Id.
15 Suitability is one of the many factors upon which a fair share allocation may be made.
Others include: (1) need for housing, (2) economic and racial integration, (3) equality of
distribution of the regional need, (4) population proportions, (5) proportion of existing jobs, and
(6) proportion of future jobs. See Rose, Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which Formula
Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs?, 12 URa. L. ANN. 3 (1977).
90
91
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It is important for the judiciary and other intervenors in the
planning process to recognize that there is no objective method of
weighing the relative importance of each of the many factors that
determine "suitability." It is precisely for this reason that, once planning studies are made and professional evaluations of those studies are
offered, the planning process must be continued in a forum comprised
of elected representatives who possess the democratic and constitutional authority to make policy decisions.
This creates a difficult dilemma for the court: If an easy-to-apply
allocation formula such as proportion of future jobs or proportion of
racial minorities is adopted, a municipality's obligation will be assigned without regard to the "principles of sound planning." If, on the
other hand, the allocation formula considers the many factors involved in the "suitability" of each municipality, the judgment of the
court on these issues will be vulnerable to attack as an unwarranted
intrusion into the legislative process. The court in Mount Laurel II
attempted to avoid this dilemma by authorizing the appointment of a
professional planner as a master to formulate the housing allocation
plan. 96 Although the master, as an expert, can bring professional
competence and seasoned judgment to the process, in actuality he is
no better situated than the court, for he too lacks the authority to
make the policy decisions upon which "suitability" must ultimately
rest. Moreover, it may be argued that a planner hired and appointed
by a court as a master will be no more objective than a planner hired
by the developer or the municipality. 97 Each planner will provide his/
her expertise to support the goals of his/her client. Neither the allocation recommendations of the court-appointed master nor the ideology
of the appointing judge will necessarily lead to either planning truth
and justice or wise urban planning.
Builder's remedy (bil darz e rem a do ), n. a form of redress by which
a builder-plaintiff in exclusionary zoning litigation is compensated for
damages suffered as a result of the invalid zoning ordinance by a
judicial order permitting him to proceed with his proposed development, subject to prescribed conditions.9"
The underlying purpose of the builder's remedy is to provide
builders with an incentive to challenge exclusionary zoning ordi-

Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 218, 456 A.2d at 420.
For a discussion of the objectivity of a court-appointed master, see Rose, supra note 6, at
126-27.
88 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53.
96

17
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nances. °9 The New Jersey Supreme Court has authorized the builder's
remedy based upon its determination that without this incentive,
many unconstitutional ordinances would remain unchallenged. Thus,
where a developer succeeds in Mount Laurel litigation and proposes a
project which provides a substantial amount of lower income housing,
this remedy is granted unless the municipality establishes that environmental or other substantial planning concerns demonstrate that
the proposed project is clearly contrary to sound land use planning.10 0
Although the court concluded that a commendable public policy
objective underlies the builder's remedy and despite its warning that
the decision would not be "a license for unnecessary litigation,'' ° l
Mount Laurel II represents a judicial policy which encourages litigation. This marks a departure from the courts' traditional approach of
discouraging parties from instigating or promoting litigation for a
reward or a share of the resulting judicial spoils as in champerty and
maintenance. Rather than establishing policy that determines the
types of issues to be litigated, courts traditionally have served as the
forum in which to resolve the issues brought before them. Municipalities are responding to the court's departure by decrying the staggering
cost of litigation they face in defending their master plans and land
use regulations from attack by profit-inspired and frequently wellfinanced plaintiff-builders.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's authorization of trial courts to
provide a "builder's remedy" not only adds another phrase to the
lexicon of exclusionary zoning litigation but has serious implications
for the preservation of the principle of separation of powers. The new
remedy involves the judiciary in legislative policymaking functions
and involves the trial courts in administrative actions beyond the
traditional scope of judicial propriety, competence, or mandate. By
authorizing the granting of a builder's remedy, the court in Mount
Laurel II had made it necessary for the trial courts to evaluate the
merits of the builder's proposal and to oversee the process of promulgating and enforcing conditions to guide and control the builder's
development over a period of time. This process will require (1)
personnel, i.e., specially qualified judges and "special masters"; (2)
creation of an administrative mechanism; and (3) money.
"IDuring oral argument, the Chief Justice posed several questions to the representative of
the Office of the Public Advocate whose answers to those questions made it clear that the Public
Advocate's office had insufficient funds to undertake the responsibility of assuring municipal
compliance with Mount Laurel. See supra note 29.
'00 Mt. Laurel I1,92 N.J. at 279, 280, 456 A.2d at 452.
101Id. at 280-81, 456 A.2d at 453.
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A. Personnel
Experience in New Jersey exclusionary zoning litigation has demonstrated that some judges lack the necessary expertise to review many
of the complex issues that arise in this area of the law. 102 To overcome
this problem, three specially qualified judges have been designated to
handle all Mount Laurel litigation in the future. 10 3 Each judge is
exclusively responsible for a particular area of the state. All litigation
challenging a land use regulation in a municipality on Mount Laurel
grounds is to be assigned to a corresponding 0 4 judge. It is expected
that this process will guarantee the smooth implementation of the
Mount Laurel II mandate.
Even the most competent judge, however, will not have the time
or resources required to formulate and administer an appropriate
"builder's remedy." Promulgating the details of the builder's development and overseeing the municipal review and approval processes, as
well as supervising the builder's performance of his obligations thereunder, will have to be delegated to a professionally competent agent
of the court-the "special master." The court delineated the functions
of a "special master" appointed to assist a municipality in the revision
of its land use laws'0 5 and authorized trial courts to "freely appoint a
master to aid in the implementation of their order."'' 6 This appointment, as the court clearly stated, does not include a delegation of

"I The author has testified as a planning expert in two of the major New Jersey exclusionary
zoning cases and has found the dramatically divergent range of judicial competence to be
manifest. Also, Judge George Gelman noted in Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor of Township of
Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1974), modified, 74 N.J. 470, 397
A.2d 6 (1977), where he appointed two urban planners to assist the court in formulating an
appropriate judicial remedy: "[J]udges have not been known to possess any particular expertise
in either zoning, or planning." Id. at 207, 329 A.2d at 96. The procedure by which judges are
designated in the State of New Jersey does not include compliance with standards to assure that
newly appointed judges have competence in planning, zoning, and other forms of land use
regulation. See also Levin & Rose, The Suburban Land Use War: Skirmish in Washington
Township, New Jersey, URn. LAND, May 1974, at 14 (discussion from perspective of courtappointed planning consultants).
"o3Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 253, 456 A.2d at 439. The following judges have been assigned all
litigation initiated after January 20, 1983 that includes a Mount Laurel challenge to land use
regulations of a municipality within the judge's district: Judge Stephen Skillman, northern
district consisting of Sussex, Warren, Morris, Bergen, Passaic, Hudson, Essex, and Hunterdon
Counties; Judge Eugene D. Serpentelli, central district consisting of Ocean, Somerset, Mercer,
Monmouth, Middlesex, and Union Counties; Judge Anthony L. Gibson, southern district consisting of Burlington, Camden, Gloucester, Salem, Cumberland, Cape May, and Atlantic Counties.
111 N.J.L.J. 638 (June 16, 1983).
101Mt. Laurel II,92 N.J. at 253-54, 456 A.2d at 439.
'05 Id. at 281-84, 456 A.2d at 453-55.
'o1 Id. at 332, 456 A.2d at 480.
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judicial power to the special master. 10 7 The final decision regarding
legal compliance of the builder's remedy remains with the judge.10 8
B. Administrative Mechanisms
In considering the validity of a builder's Mount Laurel challenge,
the trial court must initially consider whether the proposed development violates environmental constraints or is contrary to sound land
use planning. 0 9 If either condition exists, the builder will be denied
relief. 10 If the builder receives a favorable ruling, the role of the trial
court is not terminated: The court will then have a direct and longterm responsibility to assure that the builder's development "provides
a substantial amount of lower income housing.""' To fulfill this
obligation the trial court will have to establish standards and an
administrative mechanism to (1) determine the eligibility of low income buyers and/or renters and to review their continuing eligibility;
(2) review rents and other charges to low income renters; (3) approve
purchasers and the initial and subsequent sale prices of housing
units.'' 2 In addition, an administrative mechanism will be needed to
respond to the technical legal problems that must be resolved upon
such events as mortgage foreclosure, default in rent payments, and
death of an owner.
C. Money
Administering the builder's remedy will involve both direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs include compensation for the services of the
special master. This compensation is to be paid in its entirety by the
municipality. 113 In addition, the municipality will have to absorb the
costs incurred by a unit of government to oversee the administrative
problems discussed above. Whether that municipal agency is called a
public trust, 1 4 a public housing authority, or a sub-unit of an existing
municipal entity, there will be line and staff personnel as well as
overhead costs of operation that will have to be paid out of the

Id. at 284, 456 A.2d at 455.
101Id. at 332, 456 A.2d at 480.
10 See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
110 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.
107

Id. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453.
For an analysis of some of the problems involved in the judicial administration of a
builder's remedy, see Rose, supra note 6, at 115, 132.
"3 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 281 n.38, 456 A.2d at 453 n.38.
11 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
12
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municipal budget. Other costs include the services of the planning
board attorney, the municipal attorney, and the planning board staff.
15
All of these costs will have both tax rate and spending limitation'
consequences in many New Jersey municipalities.
Excessive restrictions and exactions (ik ses' iv * ri strik' shanz * and 0
ig zak' shanz), n. inordinate, exorbitant or extravagant restraints or
limitations and requirements of a payment when none is due.
In order to meet their Mount Laurel obligations, municipalities, at
the very least, must remove all municipally created barriers to the
construction of their fair share of lower income housing. Thus, to
the extent necessary to meet their prospective fair share and provide for their indigenous poor (and, in some cases, a portion of the
region's poor), municipalities must remove zoning and subdivision
restrictions and exactions that are not necessary to protect health
116
and safety.
Although the court recognized the difficulty of balancing "the
need to reduce the costs of its regulations against the need to protect
health and safety adequately,""' 7 the Justices were firm in the belief
that relatively objective guides existed to resolve this problem. " 8 In so
holding, the court once again failed to discern the difference between
"objective guides" and basic legislative policy decisions that determine
the character and amenities of the community.
The problem of defining "excessive restrictions" may be easier for
zoning regulations than for subdivision law: maximum number of
bedroom restrictions may be excessive; expensive amenities for apartment houses, such as swimming pools and tennis courts may be excessive; minimum floor area requirements may be subject to "objective
guides," and determined to be excessive. But even the well-litigated
zoning cases leave unresolved many issues for which there are no
"objective guides."
A minimum lot size of one acre throughout the municipality may
be excessive. Would a lot size of 70 x 100, or 50 x 100, be acceptable?

New Jersey is one of several states that impose spending limitations on state and municipal
governments. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-45.1 to -87 (1980 & West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). For
an analysis of some of the land use and development consequences of spending limitations, see
Rose, Limitations on State Taxation and Spending: The Impact on Future Land Use and
Development, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 91 (1980).
11 Mt. Laurel II,92 N.J. at 258-59, 456 A.2d at 441 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 259, 456 A.2d at 442.
115

118

Id.
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What proportion of the undeveloped land would have to be allocated
to the small lot size? To what extent are front, rear, and side yard set
back requirements valid? Would the availability of sewage facilities
be relevant? How useful are "objective guides" which apply to all
municipalities, but do not consider the unique facts of the particular
municipality in issue? Can the relative importance of the many development constraints such as impact on the road system, adequacy of
water, sewage, and educational facilities, potential detriment to ecological amenities, or fiscal capacity to provide requisite services, be
determined on the basis of "objective guides" or does this determination involve basic legislative policy judgments?
The issue of what would constitute an "excessive" subdivision
requirement is even less amenable to "objective guides." Under what
circumstances are sanitary sewers and storm drainage facilities necessary to protect health and safety? Are sidewalks necessary? Would a
requirement of sidewalks on only one side of the street be sufficient to
protect the public health? Would narrower and less expensively built
roadways protect the public safety? Are street curbs and gutters necessary? Is the requirement of underground electric and telephone utility
installations an excessive cost generating exaction?
Are requirements for landscaping and street tree plantings necessary to protect the public health? It seems clear that the next round of
Mount Laurel battles will be fought on the subdivision front-on the
street, on the sidewalks, and behind the bushes, if any, of new developments. There will be heated debates about the "objectivity" of
"guides" to determine the necessity for storm drainage, curbs, gutters,
sidewalks, and other cost generating subdivision exactions, but it is
going to be very difficult to prove that flowers, bushes, and trees are
necessary to protect health and safety. It may turn out that the
primary accomplishment of this requirement of the Mount Laurel
decision will be to eliminate the forsythia, the rhododendron, and the
flowering dogwood that previously adorned the otherwise bleak countenance of new housing construction in New Jersey.1 9
A more serious consequence of the judicial decree that municipalities must remove "excessive restrictions and exactions" to meet their
Mount Laurel requirements is the jeopardy it creates for the tradi-

"' See Rose, How Will New Jersey Municipalities Comply?, 35
(Mar. 1983).
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tional grid design (with cul de sac variations) used in suburban subdivisions. Once a trial court enters into the business of determining
which subdivision requirements are necessary to protect public health
and safety and which are excessive, it is only a matter of time before
one of the three Mount Laurel judges begins to realize that there is
nothing sacrosanct about the traditional subdivision design. It won't
be long before someone realizes that most suburban land use regulations require each housing unit to be built on its own individual lot
with its own driveway and garage, its own sidewalk, curbs and gutters, landscaping, and individual and repetitive utility connections. It
won't be long before someone calculates the cost of an individual
garage, sidewalks, utility connections, etc., and realizes that the most
effective method of reducing the cost of suburban housing, after
reducing the amount of floor area, is to eliminate the individual lot
and individual garage and to build housing units with common walls
in "quads" (groups of four units), or two story "octi-pads" (groups of
eight units). Each multi-unit structure will have a common out-ofdoors parking lot, limited, and less expensive sidewalks and landscaping, and less expensive construction and utility connection costs.
Once the trial courts comprehend the significance of these issues
they will be ready for the next round of "exclusionary zoning" litigation. The underlying issue will be the same as before, namely, are
these the kinds of questions that should be resolved by economic
forces, municipal governing bodies, state legislators, or by three specially designated trial court judges?
II.

NEW LEGAL PHRASES CREATED IN REACTION
TO THE COURT'S NEW CONcEvrs

The new legal phrases created by the court in Mount Laurel II
should not be dismissed lightly as innocent lexicographic offerings of
an imaginative and poetic judiciary. It is common knowledge to
students of philology that the culture, moral system, and aesthetics of
a society may be revealed and are influenced by the existence or nonexistence of words. The existence of a word in a society's vocabulary is
evidence of that society's awareness of its meaning. The absence of
words to describe concepts or relationships is also evidence of the
society's social, ethical, and aesthetic concerns. In some primitive
societies, where there is no word for "romantic love" or "jealousy,"
there is little, if any contemplation of the concepts these words describe. The introduction of such phrases as "unjust enrichment," "betterment," "floating value," and "development rights" in the Uthwatt
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Report 120 in England in 1942 probably will have a greater long-term
effect upon land use regulation and planning than the Town and
County Planning Act of 1947121 enacted to respond to those issues.
The additions to the lexicon of exclusionary zoning litigation
described in the first section are more than a collection of selected
addendum to a land use law vocabulary list. Taken together they
embody a value system, a perspective, and a judicial philosophy. As
such, they invite a reaction and response in the form of other phrases
that may also be added to the exclusionary zoning lexicon. The following are suggested as the beginning of a list of phrases that will be
created in time in response to the court's new concepts: (1) "constitutional brinkmanship," (2) "skillful municipal obstinacy," and (3)
"waning judicial legitimacy."
Constitutional brinkmanship (kdn'st@ too'shan @I o brink man ship'),
n. a strategy for achieving an objective by undertaking the risks
involved in pressing a cause to the edge of precipitous constitutional
consequences, for example, the policy of the New Jersey Supreme
Court to pursue its antiexclusionary zoning objectives to the limit of
constitutional authority.
The power of state courts to resolve controversial policy issues,
and all other matters in their jurisdiction, may be limited by the state
and federal constitutions, and within those constitutional limits, by
the state legislature. The New Jersey Constitution expressly makes the
state supreme court the appellate court of last resort in all issues
arising there. 22 When, during oral argument of Mount Laurel II, one
of the attorneys dared to suggest that the supreme court would exceed
its judicial authority under the separation of powers provisions of the
state constitution if it ordered the remedies proposed by plaintiffs, one
of the Justices put this argument to rest with the following rhetorical
question: "Doesn't the constitutional mandate for separation of
powers depend upon how it is interpreted by this court?"
Once it is established that the New Jersey Constitution means
what the state supreme court says it means, it becomes easy for that

120 Expert Committee On Compensation and Betterment, Final Report (Uthwatt Report)

Cmd. No. 6386 (1942). For a brief description of some of the new vocabulary introduced in the
Uthwatt Report and a short bibliography of articles on the British experiment in land use
planning in the 1940's, see Rose, A ProposalFor the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights As a Technique To Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635, 642-45 (1974).
121 Town and County Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51.
122 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 2.
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court to decide that the constitution contains a due process clause and
an equal protection clause, even though it does not. Moreover, once
the court determines that these provisions exist, it can effortlessly
construe them as being more demanding than the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. Through this
reasoning process it becomes possible for the court to make legislative
policy decisions and to establish an administrative-like mechanism to
enforce the legislative-like standards of those policy decisions. While
the logic of the court's reasoning is impeccable, the wisdom of its
conclusion is uncertain. Nevertheless, the court's reasoning does eliminate one-half of the issue of constitutional brinkmanship: It must be
conceded that no aspect of Mount Laurel II violates the New Jersey
Constitution while that court sits.
The possibilities for constitutional brinkmanship with the Federal Constitution is another matter. It is the United States Supreme
Court that has the last word on what that document means. Although
it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will impose its
interpretation of the federal separation of powers doctrine on the state
constitutions, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and
the taking provision of the fourteenth and fifth amendments of the
Federal Constitution do impose limitations on state excercise of
power, including the actions of state judiciaries. Once the trial courts
begin to apply the principles and standards set forth in Mount Laurel
II, then it is only a matter of time before a court will be called upon to
impose land use restrictions upon a recalcitrant municipality that has
limited the use of land in a way that raises federal constitutional
issues. The trial courts will tread on the brink of the constitutional
precipice when they impose the concepts of "overzoning" and/or
"mandatory set-asides" upon the system of municipal land use regulation.
Adoption of the term "overzoning," because the word itself conveys its inherent vulnerability to the standard of reasonableness required by the concepts of due process of law and equal protection of
the laws, was not the wisest of choices. "Overzoning" is a relatively
new concept that was introduced in exclusionary zoning litigation and
would have been avoided as anathema in the early days of establishing
the constitutional validity of zoning laws.123 "Overzoning" is a con-

123

An historical perspective of the extent to which the criteria of valid zoning have changed

from the days of its original objectives to today's objectives of "overzoning" may be derived from
the analysis of the legal issues before the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), as described in S. TOLL, ZONED AMErUCAN (1969).
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cept that is contrary to the principles of sound land use planning. It is
a technique that does not seek to use the information derived from the
studies of the planning process for the purpose of developing a comprehensive and balanced land use plan. Rather, it is a technique that
defies the principles of sound planning because it calls for designation
of more land for high density residential use than would reasonably be
required by the available data.' 2 4 The objective sought by advocates
of "overzoning" is clear: to create an oversupply of land for high
residential use so as to reduce the market value of such land, thereby
lowering the costs of housing for lower income persons. When, and if,
a New Jersey court requires "overzoning" to achieve this objective, it
may be challenged under the federal due process clause on the
grounds that the purpose sought to be achieved by the law is unreasonable. This challenge would be based on the law's intention to lower
the market value of plaintiff's land to achieve a purpose, i.e., the
financing of housing for lower income persons which would more
reasonably be achieved by alternative programs. It would also be
challenged under the federal equal protection clause on two grounds:
First, that the law discriminates unreasonably against owners of land
whose characteristics are not reasonably related to the use assigned by
the zoning law, and second, that it imposes upon such landowners a
disproportionate obligation to finance lower income housing. Finally,
"overzoning" devices would be challenged under the federal taking
clause on the grounds that the diminution of the market value of
plaintiff's land resulting from the intentionally created oversupply,
allegedly intended to promote the public good, constitutes a taking
just as effectively as a formal condemnation or physical invasion of the
property.

25

Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court does not admit that the
purpose of "overzoning" is to create an oversupply of high density
residential use land to lower the market value. The purpose of "overzoning," as described by the court, is to allow for more than the fair
share of the region's housing needs because it is likely that "not all of
the property made available for lower income housing will actually
result in such housing. " 26
This explanation is something less than candid, cogent, or comprehensive and ignores the fact that zoning laws do not specify the
economic characteristics of the occupants of land, i.e., zoning laws do

124
125

See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
12"Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
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not designate zones for use for "lower income housing," "middle
income housing" or "higher income housing." Zoning laws do specify
the permitted density of development. Although there may be a correlation between permitted land use density and housing cost per unit,
zoning laws never have been an effective means of assuring that the
potentially lower land cost per housing unit, resulting from the economic advantage of building more units on a piece of land, will be
passed on by the owners or developers to the housing consumer.
The higher market value of land created by increased zoning
density is usually appropriated by the landowner and/or the developer
in proportions determined by the relative strength of their bargaining
positions. To the extent permitted by the real estate market, the
landowner will try to raise his price to reflect the increased zoning
density. The relative supply and demand for land in the area will
determine the extent to which the landowner will have to share the
increased value with the developer-buyer. There is no assurance that
land zoned for higher density will be used for lower income housing.
Developers usually build higher priced units with their accompanying
higher margin of profit as long as there is a market for such units.
Only when that demand begins to dry up or where there is an oversupply of land, causing land prices to go down, will there be an
economic incentive to build lower priced housing. This lowering of
land prices is the objective of "overzoning." It remains to be seen
whether the due process, equal protection, and taking provisions of
the Federal Constitution allow the New Jersey courts to require municipalities to impose upon a relatively small group of real estate
owners, the cost of providing lower income housing to meet regional
needs.
Federal constitutional issues will also be invoked if the courts
require municipalities to adopt mandatory set-asides. The word
"mandatory" has a specific, unrelenting, and almost inherently harsh
meaning: It involves something that is required or obligatory; it must
be done-there is no opportunity for escape! A mandatory set-aside is
a requirement that a developer include some proportion of lower
income housing in the project. In effect, the court has made the
mandatory set-aside one of the affirmative measures necessary for a
valid municipal zoning ordinance. Thus, to be valid, a municipal
zoning ordinance must contain provisions that prohibit the use of
designated land unless the development includes some proportion of
low income housing. Under such law the owner has no choice: If he
cannot provide for a specified proportion of lower income housing, he
cannot use the land. Once again, the court's choice of words may
invite federal judicial scrutiny.

1984]

MOUNT LAUREL SYMPOSIUM

The New Jersey Supreme Court could have avoided this trip to
the constitutional brink by adopting the compromise proposed by the
Regional Planning Board of Princeton.' 27 This group of planners,
whose studies and proposals were noted favorably by the court, 12 8
rejected the mandatory set-aside because it seemed to be too harsh and
unreasonable. Instead, the Princeton planners proposed an optional,
conditional, high density program.129 Under this proposal, owners
would be given a choice to develop the land as of right at a lower
density or to develop at a higher density on condition that a specified
number of lower income housing units be included. 130 The court may
find it prudent at some future date to redefine mandatory set-asides to
include this option and thereby eliminate one component of its constitutional vulnerability.
Skillful municipal obstinacy (skil' fl 9 myoo nis' a p'1 * dib' sto na se),
n. a strategy adopted by local governments to use imaginative techniques to preserve their concept of their legal right to govern their
local affairs, subject to general laws enacted by the state legislature,
notwithstanding the decision in Mount Laurel II. The word "skillful"
is intended to convey a union of both "knowledge" and "readiness."
The available techniques will be known to most municipal governing
bodies, but only a few will have the "readiness" to use them.
Many municipalities will comply with the law as determined by
the highest court in the state. Some will, in all good faith, seek to
comply only to be told by the court that good faith is not enough and
that they must do more. "' Other municipalities, currently burdened
by high litigation costs, will seek to put an end to those costs by
compromising, capitulating, or doing whatever else is necessary. On
the other hand, some municipalities may determine that the intricate
and complex network of standards, procedures, and remedies set forth
in Mount Laurel II create a simplistic and unworkable response to an
even more intricate and complex network of economic, political,
social, and psychological forces, thereby necessitating a response by
those municipalities to seek devices and techniques to protect their
perceived self interest.

127 See PRINCETON MASTER PLAN,

supra note 51.

...See Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. at 266-67 nn.28 & 29, 269-70, 456 A.2d at 445-46 nn.28 & 29,
447.
2' See PRINcErON MASTER PLAN, supra note 51.
130 Id. at 94.
13' See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
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It is much too soon to compile an exhaustive list of techniques
that could be devised to frustrate the judicial aspirations set forth in
Mount Laurel II. It is likely, however, that some of the following
devices will be used in some form.
A. Enthusiastic Municipal Compliance
As paradoxical as it may seem, one of the most effective methods
of undermining the goals of the Mount Laurel II decision may be
enthusiastic compliance by the municipality. For example, because
the court believes that overzoning and mandatory set-asides are good
for lower income housing, a municipality could require such set-asides
in most, if not all, undeveloped land appropriate for residential use.
This device will immediately discourage all development by most
smaller builders who do not want to get involved in the potential risk,
prohibitive legal fees, and high administrative costs and unnecessary
red tape incurred in the implementation of an affirmative measures
program.
Enthusiastic compliance with the law may be pursued even further by providing for the highest reasonable minimum percentage of
set-asides for housing for lower income persons. For example, the
minimum percentage of set-asides for lower income housing could be
raised from twenty percent to thirty percent, or higher, thereby severely limiting the economic feasibility of the project and diminishing,
if not eliminating, any developer interest. The judicial remedy for this
tactic would require an inordinately expensive and conjectural statistical analysis of the costs and projected revenues to determine the
maximum set-aside, if any, that is economically feasible for a given
32
site in a given municipality.
B. Rent Control
Although the Mount Laurel II decision provides an extensive
analysis of many of the complex issues of housing construction and
land use regulation, the opinion does not direct attention to the fact
that most lower income people have neither the necessary down pay-

112 The Regional Planning Board of Princeton paid $28,000 for the economic feasibility
study
made by Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC) and an additional $10,000 for a legal
feasibility study. These costs were subsidized by a grant from the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs. Contracts dated March 1, 1974 are on file at the office of the Regional
Planning Board of Princeton.
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ment to buy a house, nor a sufficiently large income to maintain one.
If any appreciable number of lower income persons are to move to the
suburbs, as the court thinks they should, they will have to live in
rented housing units.
To entice lower income persons into moving into suburban apartments at reasonable rents and then to permit those rents to be raised to
market levels beyond their financial ability would create a cruel hoax.
A suburban municipality could decide to eliminate this inequity by
enacting a strict rent control law to protect lower income tenants from
rising rents. 33 The rent control ordinance would very likely have the
additional effect of discouraging the construction of any rental units
in the municipality.
C. Regulation of Mobile Homes
The most disconcerting consequences of the Mount Laurel II
decision will not be apparent for another decade or two. The proposed mobile home development in Mount Laurel Township will be
placed on rented land. i3 4 It is inevitable that at some time in the
future the owners of the rented land on which the mobile homes are
placed will give notice of termination of the lease and require the
mobile homeowner-tenants to remove their units from the land. The
poor, lower income mobile home owner will probably find that the
cost of moving his mobile home to another site, if any are available in
the area, may approach or exceed the value of the unit at that time.
To overcome such a gross inequity, a suburban municipality
could justify the enactment of a strict "Mobile Home Owner Protection Law" that would, among other things, require (1) a mandatory
purchase option to enable the mobile home owner to buy the land at a
"regulated" price; (2) in the alternative (but less effective) a long term
lease, e.g., fifty or more years; (3) rent control of the land in mobile
home parks; and (4) regulation of utility and other charges in mobile

133 The legal authority of a New Jersey municipality to enact a rent control law in the absence
of enabling legislation has been upheld in Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303
A.2d 298 (1973); see also Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276
Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1975).
"I The entire 456-unit mobile home development proposed for Mount Laurel Township will
consist of units sold to families that will not own the land under their homes. The developer
estimated (in March 1983) that the monthly rent for the use of the land would be $175.00, but
the actual rent "may be higher or lower depending on the total costs of improvements at the
entire site." N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1983 (New Jersey Section), at 10.
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home parks. Although this type of regulation would serve to protect
the interests of the mobile home purchaser, it would also operate to
eliminate the interest of mobile home park developers in that municipality.
D. Non-Cooperationwith Non-Person Masters
The New Jersey Supreme Court seems to have overlooked or
underestimated the sense of pride, accomplishment, and authority
that most municipal officials acquire in the process of running for and
being elected to office. In most municipalities, and particularly those
in growth areas, to attain this position, the elected official will have
put in many long hours in the election process and even more hours of
dedication in the public service thereafter. This investment of time
and effort creates a sense of responsibility to constituents and a dedication to his/her office.
To many of these municipal officials the court-appointed special
master will be a non-person, an interloper, and a foreign agent,
without special privileges or rights and without the constitutional or
electoral mandate to make public policy decisions. To elected officials, the role proposed by the court for special masters is unacceptable. The elected municipal official may conclude that he is the appropriate party to function as "a negotiator, a mediator, and a
catalyst-a person who will help the municipality select from the
innumerable combinations of actions that could satisfy the constitutional obligation, the one that gives appropriate weight to the many
conflicting interests involved,' 13 5 rather than the "special master" to
whom the court assigns this rule.
Therefore, no matter how amiable, competent, and helpful the
master may be, some elected officials may resist giving that person any
rights, privileges, or courtesies other than those ordered by the court
or required by civilized behavior. Moreover, once the agent of the
court is permitted to share in the policymaking legislative, process,
some officials may even conclude not only that their obligation to
their constituency has been encroached, but that a basic principle of
democracy has been violated. As a result, in a municipality where
elected officials take this position, it will be difficult for a "special
master" to perform a constructive role. Ultimately, therefore, this
position will force the court to move closer to the brink of constitu-

Is

Mt. Laurel I1, 92 N.J. at 283, 456 A.2d at 455.
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tional confrontation by prescribing the provisions of a land use ordinance and imposing them upon a municipality against the wishes of
the elected officials.
Waning judicial legitimacy (wa' ning * joo dish'al * 1@ jit'a ma se), n.
a diminution of the public respect for and a decrease in the public's
sense of obligation to be bound by the rulings of courts, resulting from
a perception that courts do not themselves conform to and abide by
accepted legal principles limiting their authority.
Every perceptive leader and astute executive knows that there is a
price that must be paid for the successful accomplishment of an
objective that is achieved only after confrontation and the use of raw
power. For this reason, most politicians try to avoid confrontations.
For this reason, the New Jersey Supreme Court tried to avoid the use
of raw judicial power to enforce its 1975 decision in Mount Laurel I.
After waiting six years for municipalities to comply with its initial
ruling, the court has decided in Mount Laurel II that it will wait no
longer. Now, the court must pay the price of successful enforcement of
its decision.
The court expressed its awareness of the risks involved in prescribing remedies that are more like the acts of the legislative and
executive branches of government than that of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the Justices balanced that risk against what they perceived to
be a greater risk-the legitimacy of their own branch if they failed to
take the necessary action to enforce their interpretation of the constitution.
The theory and philosophy of judicial review is a complex subject
that cannot be given the attention it deserves in this article. 136 Despite
this complexity, the philosophical basis of the Mount Laurel II decision rests upon a number of assumptions that should be questioned.
A. Default of the Legislature
It is frequently suggested that the judiciary was justified in making the substantive public policy decisions contained in the Mount
Laurel decisions' 3 7 because the state legislature had defaulted on its

"I For a

recent incisive analysis of the subject of judicial review, written with wit and style,

see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1980).
137 See, e.g., Developments in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1707-08 (1978)

(observing importance of judicial activism in generating social forces necessary to secure integrated housing).
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obligation to deal with the problem of adequate housing for lower
income persons. This legislative default, the argument proceeds, has
created a vacuum that must be filled by the judiciary until the legislature performs its obligation.
At the oral argument, the attorney for a group of state legislators,
who were permitted to appear as amicus, rejected the position that
legislative default justified the making of public policy by the judiciary. The attorney argued that this position was inaccurate, since the
legislature had in fact responded to the problem with a wide variety of
enactments. Specifically, the legislature has adopted programs to provide housing for lower income persons through a state housing finance
agency,' 38 direct loans to housing mortgage lenders,1 39 state antidiscrimination laws,140 inner city urban renewal programs, 14' rehabilitation programs, 42 a uniform state building code, 143 and property tax

reductions. 144 Moreover, the legislative decision not to adopt a proposed fair share allocation bill was not a default of legislative responsibility, but on the contrary, constituted a decision that the forces
supporting such a program are insufficient to prevail in the democratic process.
The argument that judicial intervention is justified by legislative
default is too facile and sweeping. Acceptance of this argument would
validate judicial policymaking any time the legislature fails to adopt a
particular program favored by a majority of the court, even though
the program does not have the support of a majority of the elected
members of the state legislature. The legitimacy of judicial power will
suffer every time the court transgresses the limits of its proper function
by adopting a rationale that is inconclusive and debatable.

STAT. ANN. §§ 55:14J-4 to -5 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
Id. § 17:16-9. See generally New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J.
414, 267 A.2d 24 (1970) (Mortgage Finance Agency law valid delegation of legislative power).
"(' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984), id. § 40:37A-133.
141 Id. § 52:27D-44 to -58 (state aid for urban renewal projects): id. §§ 40-55C-6 & -12
(redevelopment agencies).
11 Id. §§ 55:14J-1 to -57 (New Jersey Housing Finance Agency Law), id. §§ 52:27D-52 to -161
(West. Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (Neighborhood Preservation Housing Rehabilitation Loan and
Grant Act).
13
Id. § 52:27D-119 to -151 (State Uniform Construction Code Act). See generally J.P.
Properties, Inc. v. May, 183 N.J. Super. 572. 444 A.2d 1131 (Law Div. 1982) (by enacting
Uniform Construction Code state intended to preempt field therefore township manager was
without jurisdiction over matters of enforcement and construction).
141 N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-3.69 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (improvement of homes in
blighted areas); Id. § 55:14J-2 (exemption for housing projects for low and moderate income
families); id. §§ 54:4-3.74 to -3.77 (home improvement deductions).
131

139

N.J.
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B. Elimination of the Evil
An idealistic court may be willing to suffer the pangs of waning
legitimacy if it believes that its decisions make this a better world. If
this is the justification of the Mount Laurel II decision, then the
legitimacy of the court's action will be based upon the extent to which
the elimination of exclusionary zoning results, in fact, in the construction of new housing for the poor in the suburbs and improves the lives
and opportunities of the majority of lower income urban families who
currently are unable to move there. Success of a policy or program is
an appropriate standard for the evaluation of a legislative program.
The question must be asked whether program and policy success are
inappropriate criteria for the evaluation of judicial decisions.
C. The Holocaust Imperative
At some point in the philosophical discussion of the propriety of
substantive policy decisions by courts, the proponents of judicial intervention will ask whether a court would be justified in invalidating a
45
Holocaustal policy adopted by the other branches of government.
Even the most ardent advocates of judicial restraint will be constrained to concede that under some extraordinary circumstances the
courts should and indeed must intercede. 46 Once this concession is
made, it will become difficult to determine the limits of judicial
review.
At what point does the policy of the legislative and executive
branches exceed the limits of civilized behavior so as to justify, or
compel the judiciary to make substantive policy decisions? More specifically, are the detrimental consequences of exclusionary zoning
sufficiently antisocial, evil, and uncivilized, and the causal relationship sufficiently clear for the judiciary to override the decisions of
those branches of government which have express constitutional policymaking authority? Or, is the extent of the harmful consequences,
when compared to alternative urban policies, sufficiently debatable to
withhold judicial intervention?
In prior sections of this article it has been suggested that the
wisdom of the court's policy of urban poor diaspora is at least debat41 J. ELY, supra note 136, at 181.
146

John Ely takes the following position with respect to judicial intervention: -The public has

come to expect the Court to intervene against gross abuses. And so the Court must intervene!
'Must intervene'? I'd argue not ....
But can get away with intervening'? For sure." J. ELY,
supra note 136, at 48 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 79).
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able; that a policy which would redirect upper income persons and
their financial resources back to the cities where the largest supply of
lower income housing already exists, might be a more effective policy
to benefit the urban poor; and, that there are serious doubts about the
economic as well as the political feasibility of building any significant
quantity of new housing for the urban poor in the suburbs. In the last
analysis, the judicial legitimacy of Mount Laurel II may depend upon
whether the evils of exclusionary zoning are sufficiently onerous and
the remedies sufficiently workable to justify judicial invocation of the
Holocaust imperative.

